Beyond Psychoanalysis

By L. Marcus (Lyndon LaRouche)

The Campaigner, Vol. 7, No. 1, Nov. 1973

Over the period since September, 1972, organizations of the Labor Committees in North America and Western Europe have been given preliminary exposure to techniques more advanced in some aspects than have so far been known to professional psychology. These approaches are being developed as indispensable auxiliary means for directly overcoming the fatal internal flaw of all socialist organizations, Lenin's included, up to this time. The application of psychological knowledge in this process has been a means, not an independent end.

Although the general basis for this has been identified in published items earlier and the program broadly detailed in Spring, 1973 internal transactions of the Labor Committees, several ends are served by a public account of the matter at this juncture. It is of relatively trivial significance that our report will remove credible basis for continuation of the sort of reckless, scandal-mongering speculation which the project has recently stirred up among certain nominally socialist groupings. More relevant, we provide qualified professionals with an adequate guide to their own contributing studies and reflections along the lines we outline. More important, we shall illuminate one of the most important, and hitherto fatally neglected problems of socialist organizations.

Motives for the Project

Although the writer's collateral work in related fields includes scattered projects over a period of a quarter century, the focusing of that background into the present project originated in the effort to solve certain critical problems of pedagogy in the teaching of dialectical method and Marxian economics. The elementary notion of a dialectical method itself and those Marxian economic conceptions subsumed by the notion of "extended reproduction" are ostensibly so difficult of comprehension that there has been no competent secondary writing on the dialectical method until recent years. Of all well-known Marxian economists, only Rosa Luxemburg attained a credible comprehension of Marx's notion of extended reproduction. From studies of the outstanding secondary literature and experience with well over a thousand students in the writer's course in Marxian economics, it was possible to isolate the form of the mental blockage which usually prevents comprehension of notions of that order. It was clear that remedial methods lay beyond the scope of curriculum design per se.

A more immediate prompting for the current form of the project was developed out of work undertaken under such rubrics as "The German Ideology Today." Currently, in addition to the intensive continuing study since 1968 of the development of fascist movements out of "counter-culture" and anarcho-syndicalist ferment, for over a year Labor Committee task forces drawn from (presently) each of the major branches of Western national cultures have been critically examining the origins and dynamics of the special form of capitalist ideology more or less characteristic of the dominant working-class strata of each contemporary national language sector. The cited, "The German Ideology Today," has already begun the process of publication with a series of preliminary papers. Projects in the French, Italian, English, Latin American, Greek, and Swedish ideologies today are in various stages of maturity. The dominant capitalist ideologies of workers in the U.S.A. are being analyzed by focusing on the distinctions among the U.S., (English-speaking) Canadian, and English forms of ideology.

The practical political feature of such investigations can be made obvious enough.

If each individual will look ahead, imagining himself permitted one last recurrence of consciousness at his own funeral, he must imagine himself thinking then, ''I wonder what that was all about?" Notably in the present period, when the mythos of "Zero Population Growth" is rampant, the individual considering himself as an isolated individual must find it difficult to argue against the indictment that he has been using up scarce resources, space and "employment opportunities" otherwise available to other individuals. Objectively speaking, can he ("competitively") justify his existence to society?

To the extent that the individual worker (among others) in capitalist society views himself as a mere self-evident individual, his "detached" assessment of the existential question must impel him toward the most profound despair, and even perhaps toward suicide. If he reviews each year of his adult life in detail, he has a picture of the following sort. He arises, weekdays, perhaps at about six in the morning, wretchedly bustling to get out and begin commuting to work. During the remainder of the day, his sixteen or less waking hours are apportioned somewhat as follows. Eight hours work, one to two and a half hours commuting, a half hour for lunch-a total of about two hours a day for meals and cleaning up for meals. One to three hours for chores about the house or automobile, and an hour or so propped in front of the "boob tube" sucking at a couple cans of beer or highballs. Each year, one to three weeks for a vacation-when the budget will tolerate that, and throughout it all, the years pass one by one in greying banality.

For example: in West Germany the typical young adult worker of today was "tracked" into a miserable (Volkschule) early in his education, from which he was "graduated" at the age of fifteen, when he became an apprentice, earning perhaps the magnificent monthly sum of about 300 Dmarks. This is a miserable pittance on which he could not support himself, but which usually represented a much needed supplementary income for his parents' household. After completing this apprenticeship, during which he has acquired a skill or semi skill which in a majority of cases is already obsolete, he rose typically to the magnificent monthly income of about 1,000 D marks. If he is fortunate, he, his wife, and two children spend about 300 Dmarks monthly rent for a tiny three-plus-room apartment, and perhaps eventually buys a small automobile, which is used more as a curb space display fetish for polishing than for driving (since his budget can ill afford gasoline). Yet, this oppressed West German worker typically takes pride in the fact that he is an appendage of his firm and thus a minute cog in the so-called "economic miracle" of his country.

In each country, the worker is protected against the suicidal despair of an objective view of his individual qua individual life, by seizing tightly to a set of illusions. These illusions give his individual life a fictitious sort of importance and, not accidentally, locate that fictitious importance in accepting the prevailing capitalists' rules of life for a dutiful wage slave. The general form of such capitalist ideologies is ultimately identical from country to country, but each national sector tends to be distinguished by a peculiar subspecies of that ideology, to the effect that the secondary problems of organizing workers differ correspondingly from one such sector to the next.

Consider a summary comparison of the English and U.S. workers' capitalist ideologies. Both of these English language capitalist cultures are characterized by pragmatism, but there are important differentiations between English and U.S. pragmatism. The U.S.A., at least until the most recent period, was characterized by an outlook of the sort addressed by the 1960 John F. Kennedy presidential campaign's "New Frontier" appeal to U.S. ideology. Depreciating British capital, at least for the past sixty years, distinguishes England from the U.S.A. by that vicious stagnation and (relatively) stone like social immobility otherwise expressed in the British monarchy's support from the Labour Party.

These broad distinctions underlie contradictory special distinctions between the U.S. and British labor movements. Because of greater social mobility and "frontier" outlooks in the U.S. working class, the U.S. worker has relatively greater individual combat potential. Connected to this greater relative combativity, since the U. S. is a society of change relative to the English situation, the U.S. worker is quicker to understand and accept the notion of (changing) things.

Yet, during the past thirty odd years, the English worker has been in effect more combative in class struggles than the U.S. worker! The irony of this is that the U.S. worker, just because he is more inclined to foresee change, is more vulnerable to the recurring illusion that U.S. capitalism is about to change for the better, an inclination to foresee favorable change in his personal situation which ameliorates his feeling of desperation (as an individual) under oppressive circumstances. The British worker has less confidence in his ability to individually get ahead of his mates (to find alternatives much nearer than Australia), and regards existing oppressive circumstances as something which has to be faced up to along class lines.

In net, the combativity of the English militant worker, just because of the English ideology, tends to be conservative (defensive) militancy rather than the potentially revolutionary militancy of fighting for change. The British worker tends to fight along traditional goals lines of resistance to employer and capitalist state encroachments, by contrast with the U.S. worker who is more disposed, relatively, to fight for innovations.

In each national sector, the general task of the socialist working-class organizer remains (fundamentally the same.) His essential task is to strip away the bourgeois (persona) of the worker, making it possible for the worker to tolerate the awful objective truth thus confronted by offering the worker a new, positive basis for his personal identity in the political class organizing process. Although the general form of capitalist ideology gives this problem the same basic form and programmatic remedy in all advanced capitalist sectors, the differentiations of specific sectoral ideologies require the psychotherapeutic aspects of the effort to subsume somewhat different concrete secondary forms in each such sector.

For example, the case of Italy today; The entire Italian Left demonstrates nothing so clearly as that it seems to have learned nothing, "organically" or otherwise, from the experience of 1919 1922. The best the Italian Left today could do would be to occupy the factories individually, as it did in the great upsurge of the post World War I period, and then wait for the fascist (squadristi) to pick off these factories one by one. The reason for this hysterical blindness to the lessons of history is located more immediately in the predominance of interconnected (machismo) and derived anarcho-syndicalist parochialist tendencies in the individual Italian worker. Like the French and Hispanic cultures, the Italian culture is closer to the peasant like petit bourgeois world outlook examined by Karl Marx in the (Eighteenth Brumaire) and (Poverty of Philosophy). He has a peasant like (a sociality) relative to the more socialized American or English worker-which demands of him a massive outer layer of (persona), protecting a terrified secret "Inner Self " underneath. Existentialism is not accidentally the suitable ideology of such Latin (machismo) cultures, and suicide not accidentally the only complete existentialist act. Without ripping away the Italian ideology from the Italian worker-and similar psychological surgery on the French-to speak of actual revolutionary movements in those countries is purely idle chatter.

Exemplary of the anarcho-syndicalist variant is the proto-fascist D.H. Lawrence's self revealing criticism of Walt Whitman. Lawrence charged that Whitman "leaks," referring to the American tendency to "spill the gut" even with mere acquaintances. D.H. Lawrence's reactionary social tendencies are underlined by the notorious theme of Lady Chatterly's lover (although the same bestial (Weltanschauung) permeates all Lawrence's writings). Sexual relations for Lawrence are animal, not human relations; they are a realization of the bestial sensual element of the partners, in opposition to a sensuous celebration of a human love relationship. Lawrence's sexual partners are tightly self encased "pure individuals," using one another as objects in turn. Lawrence cannot conceive of a mutual sensuous relationship between human lovers. The proto-fascist petit bourgeois character type is an isolated asocial (heteronomic) individual who finds nothing so abhorrent and frightening as the notion of sharing one's innermost thoughts with other human beings.[1]

Consider the implications of ideology for the cadres of a socialist organization. It should be obvious that all talk of socialist organizing is merely pathetic chattering unless the organization involved first settles account with the characteristic capitalist ideology chaining the minds of the workers of that sector. The cadres must first begin to settle accounts with that same ideology in themselves: the educator must himself be educated.

That is merely the negative aspect of the organizer's task. Strip away the worker's persona (his ideologized self estimation) and, if one has done nothing more, one has merely confronted the worker (qua individual) with intolerable objective reality respecting his conditions. To organize the working class one must effectively answer our hypothetical question of the funeral: "What was that all about?" One must be able to give the worker a self-conscious social identity as a person whose existence is necessary to the entire human race.

The immediate empirical location of that new self estimation for the worker is generally in the worker's activity in organizing other workers. The worker must be able to see the importance of his "Inner Self" as reflected in the positive changes in world outlook he is effecting among other workers. To communicate this new sense of self to the worker, the cadre himself must have a clear self-consciousness of his own identity in the same general terms.

It will be clearer toward the later parts of this present report that the two problems, that of Marxian pedagogy and that of overcoming ideology, are ultimately the same matter. Retrospectively, this is now clear to the leading layers of the International Caucus of Labor Committees and the National Caucus of Labor Committees. It was not quite so clear in fact until the Fall Winter, 197273 months, when the ICLC's growth confronted it with the urgency of conceptualizing a practice based on understanding of national ideologies. It was not quite so clear until the work of organizing employed and unemployed, Black, Hispanic, and "white" workers into a common NUWRO formation confronted the entire NCLC membership with certain ugly ideological difficulties to be overcome as a precondition for organizing the U.S. working-class forces en masse. As the result of a self-conscious reflection on such experience, the Labor Committee tendency was forced to begin pushing the bounds of applied psychology beyond the scope of existing conceptions of psychology on certain "fronts." The tendency was compelled, like Marx, to locate the individual cadre's personal resources as a socialist organizer in creative qualities of mind which extant psychology generally did not imagine to exist (in that form).

Competent ecology rejects the Darwinian approach. The question of the viability of a new variety in a certain relative magnitude is a question of the effect of that variety's existence on, the total caloric mass of the biosphere as a whole, the rate of growth of the biomass, the rate of increase of the biomass's growth rate, with the third parameter again subsuming the other two. This relationship to the biomass is reflexive; the conditions for existence of a variety represent as aggregation of kinds of species and biological processes, which, in turn, are the preconditions for propagations of a variety in a certain magnitude. This larger aggregation, the conditions for reproductive existence of the specific type, corresponds to a parameter of the third type: that is, (the existence of such an aggregation is determined (subsumed) by a specific value for the third parameter!)

With the emergence of man, the form of evolution of the biosphere changes qualitatively. As man begins to use even deliberative cooperative forms of food gathering, and then begins to employ the simplest tools, his rate of reproduction exceeds the prior rate of evolutionary adaptation of the biosphere generally. Consequently, each mode of social existence represents What we can retrospectively identify as a specific technology, a technology which, in turn, defines certain aspects of nature as implicit "resources," which are inevitably relatively finite for that technology. Consequently, human existence is characterized by a continual overtaking of such boundary conditions, such that the more successfully a society even simply perpetuates a constant population in a specific mode, the more it exhausts the material basis for continued human existence in that mode.

Hence, human development, or the Necessity of Freedom.

In general, the existence of man demands successive modes of "Technology" (and parallel, qualitative alterations in the organization of human activity). Although these do not necessarily occur (uni-linearly), and although progress is not inevitable for each society, progress in some stems of the development of society does represent a successive ordering of human existence. The increase in population, since the Pleistocene, to approaching four billions persons today is a summation of that progressive development of "technology" and appropriate social forms.

This exceptional feature of human evolution noted, human development otherwise fits the general ecological model we summarized above. If we include the "caloric" throughput content of man (and all his activities) within the biomass, we have the approach (including man and his activities with the total biomass) through which human evolution can be fitted into a competent general "thermo dynamical" ecology.

In this approach, we determine the ordering of human societies as follows. Our first parameter is the (per capita caloric content of human consumption per se) (including all objects of human consumption): this rises, and its rate of growth tends to accelerate. We must also consider the per (capita caloric content of all human productive activities) (over and above consumption per se). This defines, for capitalist or socialist economy, the real magnitudes of V (Variable Capital), C (Constant Capital), d (Capitalists' Consumption). The expansion of this mass defines a ratio, (Sd)/(C+V), which is, obviously enough, a "free energy" ratio. (The exponential growth of this ratio, relative to the equivalent of current per capita values for C, V, d, provided that the total biomass is also growing, satisfies the preconditions for evolution of society.)

Such facts pose the question of whence the (negative entropy) of evolutionary development? Wolf gang Koehler's famous experiments with chimpanzees circumscribes the class of phenomena to be more directly investigated. Given the task oriented setting of necessity for rises in S'/(C+V), the objects presented (as objects of consumption and production) to man by his own productive output can be crudely regarded as similar in implication to the potential tools set in the cages of Koehler's chimpanzee subjects. The synthesis of a (Gestalt) by the chimpanzee. the rudimentary form of (creative mentation), is, an empirical proof of the existence of the kind of phenomena we must isolate for the investigation.

(The evolution of man is absolutely contrasted to the existence and behavior of any of the lower beasts, chimpanzees included). In the lower beasts, including the higher apes, virtually no alteration in (the range) of behavior occurs progressively from generation to generation. The per capita caloric throughput and the rates of potential growth of that species of biomass material are essentially fixed-at least in range. With man, the physiology of creative mentation, exhibited in a more rudimentary fashion by Koehler's chimpanzees, has led to deliberatively synthesized new technologies, equivalent in effect to a species deliberatively turning itself ((by will)) into a higher species (higher negentropic values). It is, indeed, man's study of his own progress through such processes of deliberation which makes possible and is scientific knowledge.

Kant and Hegel properly emphasize this distinction between man and the lower beasts. In place of a learned response to (fixed) classes of phenomena, man's deliberative process of development of his mode of behavior addresses itself to principles underlying transformations in otherwise apparently fixed classes of phenomena. It is the adduction of such underlying principles, enabling man to implicitly (at least) predict that a new form of behavior will be superior to an old form, which yields those same principles which are the subject and substance of human knowledge in general.

It is our thesis, continuing the successive development of the same kind of thesis by Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, that (the "primary substance" of human mental processes is creative mentation); this view is in direct and absolute opposition to the prevailing, reductionist conception of psychology.

Reductionist psychology locates the primary data of mind in mental events which exhibit the form of logic, in terms of discrete images or psychological material susceptible of being made conscious in the form of discrete images. Like logic, reductionist psychology accounts for the motivation of those images (elements) in terms of metaphysical notions of relations (e.g., "instincts," "drives," etc.). Even those forms of radical behaviorist psychology which pretend to deny the existence of "drives," "instincts." etc., do nothing more than rather hysterically ignore the necessary implicit assumption of such axiomatic "drives" in their schemas. We insist, on the basis of the kind of evidence cited, that (the process associated with creative mentation is the "primary substance" of the human mind, and that all other mental phenomena are determined (subsumed) by those primary processes).

That, in brief, is the case for the general thesis within which the question of human psychology must be circumscribed. The analysis of the mind is necessarily limited in usefulness and even tinged with reckless incompetence until psychology accounts for that which is the deliberative processes underlying the whole sweep of human history and prehistory in the ecological terms we have prescribed for that history. Such a view of history, Marx's view of man as a world historical being, is the constant criterion to which every conjecture must be submitted for criticism before one advances to hypothesis. (Any facts respecting psychology are obviously either false or are obviously grossly misconstrued unless they represent knowledge bearing on such an historical view of the human deliberative processes. This is our general thesis).

The Cartesian Theorems

In the emergence of fundamental new scientific conceptions and entire new world outlooks, one properly distinguishes among various proto-discoveries, which occur as improvisatory glimmerings or intuitions, and the initial systematic demonstration of some new, comprehensive principle. Throughout the Renaissance from approximately the latter part of the thirteenth century, Humanist ferment does not begin to appear as a systematic world view until Giordano Bruno (murdered by the Inquisition in 1600). Yet his writings do not stand on their own feet; it is only when we look backwards at Bruno's writings from the standpoint of Kepler (1571-1630) and Descartes (1596-1650) that we can isolate the germ of Kepler's and Descartes' systematical humanism in Bruno.

Unlike Descartes, who we shall examine here as the founder of scientific psychology, Kepler offers no direct attack on the problem of the form and content of human thought. Yet, once we look beyond plausible edification to concentrate on the fanatical determination behind Kepler's founding of modern physical science, we are compelled to adduce that philosophical outlook which impelled and regulated his discovery and proof of the existence of universal law.

A certain crude, empirical conception of physical science did of course exist prior to and following Kepler, but the advantage of Kepler over, for example, the outlook of Galileo is qualitative, not one of degree. Before Kepler, as with those who maintained or regressed to the pre

Keplerian thrust toward empiricism, the notion of the study of the regular order of nature was "pluralistic." Various categories of phenomena were treated as if separate categories of the Divine Will, within which narrow confines man could explore regularity through observation and experiment, hoping thereby to adduce the specific regularity of God's Will (Dispensation) for such classes of phenomena. Kepler cut through such pathetic forms of inquiry, specifying that (the entire universe was subject to a single principle of lawfulness, which subsumed all other, more particular forms of law). Kepler expressed this view in the argument that God's infinite (i.e., unique, comprehensive, existent) Will was (rational), i.e., susceptible of being mastered as human knowledge of even human individuals.

We have two, ultimately interconnected sorts of evidence of the determining importance of this philosophical premise in Kepler. Immediately, his papers suffice to demonstrate that he could not have sustained the effort to produce his great universal laws without the impetus and critical rigor supplied by this premise. More broadly, respecting the empiricists' objection that the general development of physical science is not shown (to them!) to depend upon such philosophical assumptions, the whole history of scientific development, from Kepler through Einstein, shows that the seminal conceptions governing the critical advances in science have been contributed chiefly by individuals in whom the kernel of Kepler's philosophical outlook operated as a largely self conscious motivation and critical faculty for their creative work.

We shall shortly show exactly such concern in the case of Descartes. As for Newton, and other representatives of that branch of Descartes' "family," the conceptual basis for the practical advances of Newton, Euler, Lagrange, et al., is principally directly taken from Kepler and Descartes. Leibniz's perception of the problem of the epistemological fallacy of entropy ("God's clock") and his efforts to develop an analysis situs, are exemplary of a different branch of the same influences. Empiricist cynics may disparage the overview of eighteenth century physics advances by Kant and Hegel. Despite these cynics, all the great formal achievements of the latter half of the 19th century, exemplified by G. Riemann, G. Cantor, F. Klein, depend upon individuals who were passionately self-conscious of the kind of contradictions in science cited by Hegel. Moreover, the principal actualized achievements of modern science (e.g., epitomized by Planck, Einstein, Schrödinger, et al.) could not have occurred except as a consequence of precisely such philosophical preoccupations of Riemann, Cantor, and Klein.

Kepler's thrust of self-development, resurrected in a more advanced form by Einstein's Riemannian approaches, distinguishes between two possible approaches to physical universalities, the continuous and the discrete, recognizing that the discrete is a lower, adumbrated form of the continuous.

In the simplest classroom sort of illustration of this point, one can emphasize the fact, formally proven by Cantor, that even in an "infinite" period of time it would be impossible to identify all of the points which can be located within any line segment, or that the curve cannot be developed from the straight line. Consequently, the attempt to discover universal laws of the complete order of nature from an ordinary algebraic (formallogical) standpoint must ultimately fail. Hence, any interpretation of the universe which assumes the universe to be an aggregation of either elementary physical particles, or of elementary discrete sense perceptions of the continuum, is necessarily false as a basis for representation of (fundamental) physical law. Consequently, Kepler's converging toward his partial demonstration that fundamental physical laws of discrete motion were properties of such continua, is an awesome achievement for his time from the retrospective view of modern knowledge. From the standpoint of Einstein and Planck (as partial realizations of Riemann and Cantor), we must regard Kepler as the virtual founder of all modern physical science.

We shall see that the necessary preference of the true continuum, over the universal aggregation of discrete elementarities, is of absolutely decisive importance respecting the nature of the human mind. In citing Kepler's case in the terms employed above, we have moved toward that result for psychology, to the extent we have indicated that the deliberative processes of creative mentation, by which man makes fundamental advances in the material precondition for his continued existence, are processes coherent with the notion of (universal continuities as the unique elementary (primitive) substance).

The essence of Humanism (and modern fundamental scientific achievements) is summed up in the Spinozan view of two theorems from Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum" ((properly translated): "I think,' therefore I am being.") and "the existence of perfection." We shall restate these in symbolic form.

(Cogito ergo sum): Every particular of human knowledge exists uniquely in the form: "I think that Xi" (i = 1,2,3,...). No Xi exists as a predicate except as a predicate of an existing subject, "I think." Therefore, if some Xi actually exists, the universal subject, "I think," not only is existent but has a superior certainty of existence with respect to that of any predicates.

Even in this form, "Cogito ergo sum" states the first approximation of the modern dialectical method. In contemporary academic jargon, "I think" is a (metalogical) existence relative to the aggregation of particular predicates. "I think" is the existence of the class for which all Xi are merely members. The "independence'' of the existence of ''I think,'' as the existence of the class as such, is demonstrated by the impossibility of including "I think" as one of the members of the class, as a member of the class which can be prescribed to exist by logical induction from even any large number of other members. The aggregation of members of the class does not logically subsume the existence of the class itself.

Although formal discussion of this problem is more or less restricted in modern times to mootings within pure mathematics and formal logic, the essential paradox (antinomy) encountered in some formal investigations is a subspecies of the same essential predicament confronted constantly in everyday psychological life. We shall demonstrate that connection, with increasing force, as we proceed. Immediately, the reader should bear this point in mind respecting the relevance of the material we are treating at this phase of the present article.

To situate Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" in the terms of reference respectively employed later by such figures as Hegel and Cantor, we argue that Descartes is willfully avoiding the induction fallacies of "bad infinity." We offer a limited view of that problem as follows. As Canter proves formally (respecting the "power set of all sets"), even an "infinite" enumeration of the terms of a class could not completely identify the totality (Gestalt) of the class. No amount (Descartes insists) of experience of the sort by which we "know" any Xi could possibly reach knowledge of the human in terms of Xi. The class as a whole ("I think" as an existent subject, the existence of the class as a whole) determines the existence of the particular members of the class, but is neither determined by them nor as one of them.

Yet, foreshadowing the kernel of Cantor's notion of transfinite numbers, from the existence of the predicates we do know the actual existence of the class as a whole dialectically. The difficulty immediately confronting one at such a point of the investigation is that the argument of "Cogito ergo sum" conditionally proves a proposition which has to be explored further before we can account fully for what the first theorem has proven. To restate the point: the argument of "Cogito ergo sum" proves the existence of the subject (the human self = "I think") (by demonstrating the absurdity of a contrary judgment). It is a "negative" proof, not yet positive knowledge of the human self (i.e., Mind). The first theorem thus begs the second, "perfection," such that the two must be regarded as interconnected, interdependent.

("Perfection"): Modify the symbolic statement to read: "I think that Xij," in which, for any value of i, j = 1,2,3,..., are successive orderings of advancement in knowledge respecting any species of experience. Employing the same dialectic used to determine the existence of the subject, "I think," for "Cogito ergo sum," what is the quality of the same subject for the expression "I think that Xij"? (Relative to any fixed ordering of knowledge) (e.g., for j = 1 throughout any "complete" class of enumerations, "I think that Xij,") ("I think" has the self-evident quality of self developing progressive change).

The attempt to interpret this from the standpoint of elementary discrete sense impressions (e.g., empiricism, logical positivism) must be rejected as a reading of Descartes' argument. I.e., Xij cannot be treated as an elementary or self-evident sense impression, since it is not only changing, but its "motion" of (change) is the primary datum (predicate) of the "set." E.g., instead of treating each Xij as a self-evident factual datum, the "cell form" of human knowledge becomes, as first approximation for hypothesis, (the process of change) linking any Xij to its successor Xi (j+l).

However, the subject can no longer be treated as empirically equivalent to the particular individual self. Since the advancement of knowledge in individuals is dependent upon developments occurring throughout contemporary society, and since the "set" of predicates for the subject of this theorem is not completed except in the future and past, the advancement of knowledge in the individual is itself merely a predicate of something (infinite: universal, unique, and comprehensive). The existent subject defined by "I think that Xij is an infinite existence of the motion of self perfection of human knowledge, which is actualized through the creative contributions of particular individuals as immediate predicates of that infinite being.

If Spinoza's interpretation of Descartes is correct in this argument, and it is absolutely correct (as far as he proceeds), then, setting the evidence for the general thesis in conjunction with Descartes' two great dialectical theorems, the motion of the human mind (its primary substance, being= self perfection), must be coherent in form and nature with the primary substance of the infinity which is the physical universe. (The form of "matter itself must be that of a self perfecting continuum), and neither an aggregation of discrete elementary particles (nor a simple, linear continuum.)

This reading of Descartes was first developed by B. Spinoza (notably, his (Ethics)) who adduced from such dialectical insights the notion that the creative principle of universal mind and universal matter motion were coextensive infinite "substances," infinitely (extended being). Spinoza was also the first to articulate the notion of an actual infinite in opposition to "bad infinity," situating this distinction in respect to the ethical predicament confronting each individual in society.

From a modern standpoint, even the application of crude engineering school thermodynamics to industrial engineering knowledge of production and distribution proves Spinoza's specific notion on this point. The material preconditions for the existence of any individual in capitalist society (or, the U.S.S.R., China, etc., as well) depends upon a worldwide network of interconnected production of both material conditions of life and of the households in which workers are accultured to be productive in terms of modern technologies. This network could not be broken up into smaller units without reversing technological development and general social productivity. The existing human population would then be largely wiped out and the residue degraded to a medieval material and cultural condition, by such autarchical "reforms." In such a world historical organization of production every creative contribution to the advancement of, or realization of innovations increasing the negentropy of the network is of universal benefit to the human race present, future-and, implicitly, (past)! Such acts of creative mentation (e.g., either in creating new knowledge or realizing its application) make each human individual responsible for these an (actually infinite being), a (concrete form of infinite being), a (concrete universal).

Spinoza's argument becomes lucid when he is read in terms of our illustration of the point. The task of the individual, he prescribed, is to locate the necessary form of progress for one's society, to also locate the "handles" of social development accessible to one's practice, and in that setting make one's active existence (creative acts) a positive and permanent (i.e., "infinite") contribution to the existence of humanity.

The individual who has competently adduced his Spinozan ethical task for his time and place, and who also self-consciously governs his actions with scientific competence to such ends, is by definition an unalienated man, a true human being. His value to society is located not in the mere specific acts ("predicates") which are useful, since the completion of the act would annul his further importance to society. His value to society is located in his (self-conscious activity); he is valuable to society not merely for what specific contributions he has made, but as he represents continuing resource, a self-conscious activity engaged in continuously struggling to make such contributions. That is the kernel of the Spinozan dialectic and Spinozan Humanism.

There is another major conceptual difficulty to be overcome in connection with the Descartes Spinoza dialectic. Hegel's devastating quip on Joseph Schelling suffices to illustrate the problem involved.

Schelling earned personal honor in philosophy by rejecting the dominant, fatuous proclivity of the eighteenth century to disregard Spinoza as a "dead dog." Yet, Schelling himself proved incapable of understanding the actual content of either Descartes or Spinoza. He accepted the idea of as "infinitely extended being,'' simultaneously mind and substance, but he had no notion of this substance as being actual self movement, actual self perfection.

The attempt to establish a "unified field theory" illustrates the point to be made. If one interprets the implications of Riemann's discoveries only in a certain limited way, pathetic fallacies are introduced which prohibit the advancement of useful experimental hypotheses respecting a comprehensive notion of universal physical law. If one interprets "continuum" as signifying a (simple) energy continuum, the cognition of the universe as a totality leads only to a notion of an infinity of Unending "Blah." Or, as Hegel demolished Schelling on precisely this account in his (Phenomenology), one's efforts to conceptualize an infinite continuum in this way leads only to "a night in which all cows are black."

To conceptualize the physical universe as a true continuum, it would be necessary to supercede the notion of simple energy by a notion of a universal continuum of negative entropy, just as exponential values for the expression S'/(C+V) define a self developing continuum for socialist society (when the elements of the ratio are proportions of total productive labor and changes in values are compared with existing per capita rates of throughput of C and V). It would be necessary, in the case of universal physics, to approach the formulation of observational and experimental hypotheses from the standpoint of recognizing that the "fundamental laws of the universe" (as we now understand the notion of the application of those laws to nearby "macro" space) must be defined as changing (in some ordered fashion) As a result, the fundamental metric of the universe must probably evolve (in some fashion) appropriate to the general, progressive evolution of the universe in general.[2]

For the reason indicated respecting Schelling's case, the elaborated comprehension of the accomplishments of Descartes and Spinoza begins with Hegel, and is essentially completed by Karl Marx's resolution of the uncompleted contributions to Spinoza and Hegel of Feuerbach. With Hegel the notion of a universal (actually infinite) self developing creative process (as primary substance) becomes the center of scientific inquiry. Indeed, all the preconditions for psychological science are completed with the successive work of Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx: as we shall show in a general way in due course.

Any intensive effort to learn to compose like Beethoven confronts the musician with a fundamental antinomy apparently identical with that adduced by Immanuel Kant. It is possible, to a certain extent, to develop from Beethoven's compositions various phases of evolution of what seem to be definite rules of composition. Yet, no matter how gifted the musician so equipped, he could not realize a single composition in this way that would not be immediately distinguishable as a mere parody. This demonstrates that the peculiar power and identity of any important Beethoven composition is located in qualities which are beyond comprehension in terms of any possible fixed set of formal rules. This demonstrates that the essential feature of such compositions is something which lies outside the domain of any understanding in terms of formal logic, etc. Yet, like Descartes' "I think," it exists.

Proceeding from that initial predicament, the next phase of the formal investigation is properly implied by the nature of the problem. To understand Beethoven systematically, that is self-consciously, it is indispensable to master the rules, the canons, to adduce certain evolving such canons for Beethoven's work as a whole, and to also adduce the new canons developed in that way. This professional competence is indispensable precisely to be able to isolate those features of the composition in which the prior rules are diabolically violated. Concentrating for the moment on the major compositions from approximately Opus 95 onwards, it is sufficient for present illustration to identify two "tricks" he introduces to give these general kinds of works their living substance, their existence, the ruses of an hubristic/genie engaged in using and even creating the rules apparently precisely to violate them. We emphasize the special use of counterpoint and "arbitrary" surprise to achieve such ironies.

The case of counterpoint-especially as Beethoven develops this essence of Western music-emphasizes the meaning of irony in this setting. Counterpoint, properly realized for its creative potentialities, is a means for exploiting a set of canons to canonically reach "structural relations" within the composition which are potentially in more or less rude violation of those same canons. Surprise is a basic approach to realizing the same effect in the opposite fashion. One introduces an ostensibly alien feature, and then guilefully makes its existence appear to be canonical through development which resolves the contradiction in an apparently lawful way-through the (creation) of new formalities.

Beethoven's "late" discovery of the fuller potentialities and significance of the fugue is the most powerful demonstration of the creative principle within music. The introduction of ironical improvisations into musical composition by itself would be merely a petit bourgeois anarchist irrationalist's act. (Truth), especially in the sense that Beethoven is a fanatic for truth in music, lies outside both the Apollonian bathes of pure formalism and the Dionysian anti-intellectualism (i.e., ant humanism, bestialism) of the capricious violation of "law" for the sake of asserting an animal sort of "freedom" from law. (Freedom) in Beethoven is as totally bounded by (Necessity) as it is in the same principled way for Karl Marx! His great late fugues most exactly express that principle of Truth.

To understand the reasons why the fugue, in its various developments (e.g., fantasy fugue, variations and fugue, etc., in Bach, Beethoven) is the highest achievement of musical composition to date, it is necessary to see music as created to celebrate that quality in the composer, performer, and audience which otherwise expresses the noblest human qualities of daily life.

Turning our view of daily life to that subsumed by our general thesis, on the most primitive level of overview of the human condition, Necessity is represented in terms of fixed natural and manmade laws. Reality, presented to society and the individual in terms determined apparently by such laws, is constantly a struggle for existence. In this view, Freedom appears as the problem solving mental activity, and realized practice, by which such Necessity bounded problems of existence are resolved. On a higher level, manmade law and technology are seen as evolving, with the result that the notion of Freedom is also enlarged in a similar way. Man, in this second view, is free to synthesize changes in (fixed) manmade and technology laws, but not in a totally arbitrary (i.e., not in an anarchistic) way. The Freedom through which manmade and technological laws can be changed for the benefit of the individual and society's existence is itself restricted by a Necessity governing this.

Arbitrary or anarchistic "freedom" in art evokes properly the same degree of intellectual interest as crude cheating at solitaire. Freedom in musical composition becomes moving, exciting when it expresses a solution to the problem of lawfully altering fixed Necessity. The late Beethoven fugues express this principle in the highest form found in art, since the peculiarity of the form is that it is so emphatically the creation of a new order of Necessity, through the introduction and development of those selected expressions of Freedom which accomplish the transition from one set of old canons to a new set.

The same principle is encountered in the admittedly rare great work of poetry. To the extent that a poem locates its subject matter in literal or symbolic features of the composition, the poet has accomplished little better than to represent prosaic ideas in a precious fashion. Bad poetry, in this respect, is associated with an emphasis on forms as such. By this standard, for example, T.S. Eliot is not a poet, and the fascist poet, Ezra Pound, is actually only a semi poet (by contrast with the banality of Eliot). The subject of a great poem is never identified within the body of the poem, neither literally (nor symbolically). Rather, the predicates of the composition uniquely demand the reader's conceptualization of a subject matter which thus seems to lie outside the poem as such: the identity of that subject matter, exactly like Descartes' "I think" in this respect, is none the less precise. This does not mean that poetry is properly a clever method of circumlocution; the subject matter of poetry is properly the sort of definite notion which does not admit of communication in extant prose forms.

By this standard Shelley is inferior to Heine as a poet. For example: Heine's ironical juxtaposition of loved persons and places in such a fashion that neither can be competently adduced as the subject, but the subject is nonetheless powerfully definite as the dialectical content. Such unearthed, unartificial compactness Shelley rarely masters. Yet, his "Ode to the West Wind" is a suitable clinical case for illustrating the principle we have cited.

It is, admittedly possible to offer a banalized reading of the "Ode...," provided one degrades the change of seasons into a matter of symbolism. This bowdlerized reading of the poet's intention evaporates for us the instant we take into account the fact that the true poetic faculty is associated with the most powerful kinds of agonized feeling states. No great poem could be written with the kind of personal detachment which the symbolic interpretation of the "Ode" imputes to Shelley at the time of composing.

Any person who has tasted the capacities for creative poetry within himself has probably frequently experienced the following sort of circumstances as those in which the impulse to write poetry overcame him. The poet experiences moments in which there is a conjunction between profound concern for others and a simultaneous agony respecting his incapacity or limited powers to aid those others. This conjunction challenges his identity in the most profound way, challenging him to create within himself, to force from his unconscious processes some new power for consciousness, without such a new power, he must fail at that particular conjunction, threatening his deepest sense of inner self-identity (the real inner self, as distinct from the personal).

Ignorant outsiders, including numerous literati, conclude from the discernment of agony in great poetic works that some ordinary sort of personal disappointment, bereavement, etc., must therefore be the prompting of the poem. In certain examples, undoubtedly, there is a specious germ of truth in such edifications. What mere educated men-that is, men lacking a sense of creative powers in themselves-fail to recognize, is that the creative personality has a different sense of inner identity than exists for the proverbial "ninety-nine and forty-four one hundredths per cent" of the population of capitalist society (in particular). Where the ordinary alienated individual vaguely senses the existence of some inner "little me," as a kind of banalized monad, the creative individual, especially the great poets and composers, locates as his inner self precisely his power for creativity. While such a poet may also experience the ordinary sort of agonies, his development of self-conscious creative powers has endowed him with a capacity for a kind of agony which is generally unknown in this way to alienated persons. The alien pressure to be an "ordinary" person, the difficulty in communicating certain kinds of conceptions to a banalized audience uniquely, problems characteristic of self-conscious creativity, confronts the creative person with a recurring fear of a special kind of "death:" fear of the day on which these egregious, fragile creative powers will cease to exist for him. It is that agony which he invariably experiences whenever he is in the throes of creative effort, and that agony which is at the same time his most powerful motivation for creative output. Hence, to be confronted in any way with the image of a human problem he cannot solve (with his existing knowledge) confronts the creative artist with the most powerful motive for drawing new qualities of knowledge from his creative powers, and at the same time threatens him with a kind of agony which few persons experience, the dreadful thought that perhaps his creative powers have mysteriously vanished ("died") since his last creative output. It is in that way that the fear of "death" of the creative inner self produces great agonies as the circumstances, theme, and motive of most of the great creative artistic productions of our culture.

The "Ode to the West Wind" can be understood as we locate the dialectical subject matter uniting Shelley's revolutionary outlook with his deep-felt personal agony respecting the fear of "death" of his inner, creative self: the fear of living biologically as the husk, the conscious coffin of a dead "spiritual" self. His "A Defence of Poetry" permits one no doubt on this. In periods of great social upsurge, he argues correctly, there is a qualitative transformation of broader populations, to the effect that they suddenly acquire power to impart and receive the most profound communications respecting man and nature. Suddenly, then, the creative artist finds an audience capable and zealous in receiving and comprehending the kinds of conceptions which more directly reflect the creative processes within him. The enlivening of the minds of his audience in this way gives the inner self of the artist a social reality. As the kinds of conceptions expressing his creative processes are suddenly susceptible of life within an ennobled audience, this audience, as the expression of society, gives reflected social existence to the inner self of the creative artist. In such periods, these inner creative powers, so given social identity, are awakened to the boldest exercise of their potentialities. The artist is astonished to find in himself the nearly constant outflow of such profound understanding as he had not imagined possible during earlier periods. He, his inner, creative self, has become alive, has an active social existence. Then, with the ebb of social ferment, his audience lose their powers of comprehension-lose their souls-and become again the old, familiar schlimihls, capable of receiving and enjoying only philistine banalities. These audiences are mystified as to what even they themselves had admired and understood in the creative works they embraced so enthusiastically during the preceding period of ferment.

That sort of relationship between the creative artist, and society (through the mediation of his audience) is the constant ironic theme of all great works of art; the life death struggle of the artist's inner self, his creative faculties. It is the content, the deeply personal, sensuous content, he locates in every other subject and sensuous experience upon which he draws. The greatness of Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is that it expresses in a more concentrated and exact way that same topic which is merely circumscribed through prose in his essays, "On Love" and "A Defence of Poetry."

Anyone who has written poetry expressing sensibility of the creative process as his own identity, must sadly concede the obvious superiority of music over poetry as a creative artistic medium. The fact that poetry is so closely linked to prose in its predicates causes extraordinary difficulty in the effort to uniquely force the dialectical subject matter into the perception of the reader. The longer a poem becomes, the more monstrous this problem becomes: literal aspects, symbolic aspects constantly threaten to give credence to unwanted banal interpretations of the subject matter. A great poem must perforce be a short poem, which through its economy and concentration, permits no reasonable communication but that intended. The fact that Western musical development has created a medium which is a sensuous medium and yet distanced from commonly literal employment of its predicates establishes music as a medium in which the impossible desire of every great poet can be attained: the development of a single conception over the duration of an audience's prolonged attention span. Yet. music is not "abstract" in the bathetic sense of "abstractness'' sought by such zombies as the serialists or by the nonobjective schools of the plastic forms. Its essential predicate, musical sound, has developed from the root of prosody in language, and thus expresses the most immediate sensuous aspect of social relations in intensely abstracted fashion. It is the most advanced art form for this reason: it is the medium in which we can most freely and intensely exercise the creative process in a medium of concentrated socialized sensuousness.

In this section so far, we have confined our attention to the most general and essential aspect of the content of great art: art as a medium for communicating, celebrating and strengthening the creative processes in artist and audience. We have not yet attempted to get inside the process itself, to discriminate among the differing qualities of affective states ("moods") which the creative process-and its productions-may represent as differentiations of itself. Mentioning our awareness of that omission should suffice to dispel any fears we have ignorantly overlooked such further considerations.

Social Roots of Creative Art

Situating a great Beethoven composition within our general thesis, we note that the quality which he expresses, and so evokes from his audience, in the creative identity of the whole development of the composition, is nothing but that quality which distinguishes man from the lower beasts. What distinguishes man from the lower beasts, the quality within him which enables him to live and develop as man, is the creative power for deliberatively developing new technologies, etc., through which man overcomes the entropy of outlived forms and supercedes these outlived forms by rising to higher states of negentropy. To the extent that an art form is an elaboration of the connection of Freedom and Necessity, as the definition of that is developed by Marx, it is essentially a celebration of that in man which is distinctly human.

This has the most profound implications. From this standpoint, we cannot regard great art of any medium as either mere entertainment or indifferent to scientific criteria. Art, as a medium for the concentrated expression of the creative faculty by artist and audience, addresses itself to that in the individual which is human, those qualities of mentation upon which the advancement of society, even the mere perpetuation of society, depends absolutely. To the extent that any form of art contains and expresses creative activity of the form of Freedom/Necessity, it is a special and indispensable form of (universal labor); the artist, as the great abstract mathematician does in a different way, arouses and shapes new creative powers in the audience at the same time his work celebrates and strengthens those powers which are already matured.

By contrast, any art which is merely an application of established artistic canons, mere repetition of sensuous gimmickry without creative development (bestialized art, e.g., Rock, "socialist realism," etc.), is antihuman, reactionary. Art could not be a matter of personal taste preferences; it is not personal tastes which properly judge art, but art which judges the mental condition reflected by the symptomology of taste. To the extent that any individual prefers Rock or serial composed music to Beethoven, that evidence alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the individual has been bestialized in his self estimation; no person could "enjoy" Rock or regard serial composition as honest music unless his alienation had become sufficiently pathetic that he no longer even desired to recover those human qualities he has been denied. As for the person who "likes both Beethoven and Rock," that is sufficient, too, to prove that he has lost the power to listen to the content of Beethoven's music.

The object of Beethoven seminars in the Labor Committees, like the object of this outline of the case here, is to provide the means by which the individual can become self-conscious of his "power to be powerfully moved" by that quality of great art which defies elucidation by ordinary formal criticism. Since one is able to demonstrate, along the lines of the Cartesian "perfection" theorem, that the essential content, the identity of great art, is located in the expression of the creative process, the individual is so enabled to identify that within himself which responds to this as his own creative processes. By making himself self-conscious of the way in which Beethoven, for example, attains such effects, the individual is then equipped to locate those feeling states in himself, as empirical knowledge of those states, which correspond to the experiencing of the creative moment of the work of art. In general, the positive function of artistic criticism is to assist audiences in so "isolating" and self-consciously conceptualizing such a relationship between the creative content of art and the responsive movements of the creative potential in themselves.

The objective and potentiality of self-consciously studying Beethoven in that fashion is to locate in oneself that quality which must become one's sense of "inner Self" identity, as a precondition for becoming either, specifically, an effective political working-class organizer or, in the future, a true human being.

There is nothing mysterious, generally speaking, in Beethoven's continued preeminence as the most advanced musician down to the present day. Although certain kinds of progress have occurred in music since Beethoven, up to approximately the end of the last century (e.g., Mahler, Wolf), the dynamic of creative development in music shifted after Beethoven, from its former general upward sweep into him, down hill. No musician after Beethoven has actually comprehended, and thus built upon, the (full) implications of his last period of work. For music to advance today, it would have to begin its advance by going back to Beethoven and adducing from his last period the proper point of departure for actual, comprehensive progress. Respecting what was accomplished after him, these are secondary advances whose positive features could be duly assimilated into the general progress.

This matter of contrary long upward and subsequent declining sweeps is not principally a result of anything which can be comprehended within the bounds of music or musicians per se. Beethoven, like Goethe, Shelley, Heine, reflected and embodied the culmination of the greatest mass wave of intellectual ferment in human history, the great upsurge of Humanism from the Renaissance through the culmination of the French Enlightenment in German culture. In this respect, Beethoven is to be compared to Kant and Hegel. Kant and Hegel epitomize the flowering and further advance of Humanism in backward Germany at the very point that upward development in philosophy had come to a halt in the countries of its origin, notably England and France. Although the effort to locate the motivation of Beethoven's compositions in specific aspects of the social and political revolution of his time is "program musical" edification, Beethoven expresses the Enlightenment in Germany in precisely the fashion implied by Shelley's "A Defence of Poetry." If there might have been some specific influences of political events on Beethoven, such demonstrations would have very little bearing on anything of importance here. The relationship to the creative artist to periods of revolutionary ferment is not so much to the political and social movements as such as to the effect of these developments upon the mental powers of his audiences."[3]

If we consider Beethoven's development as a musician, his youthful training in Bach, his saturation in Mozart, etc., and also examine the milieu in which he developed later, he was a product of a closely interwoven fabric of Humanist musical development throughout Western Europe which had persisted with increasingly bold advances since the Renaissance. He enjoyed a developed audience as well as a setting amid such a great proliferation of the most gifted composers as the experience of no living person could approximate. This musical world, despite its considerable antipathy to the French Revolution and the merest hint of sans culottism, inevitably reflected, like the French Enlightenment of Frederick the Great, the intellectual upsurge of the Enlightenment, despite its own immediate political intent.

As to what the impact of these forces was upon Beethoven, his music from the Bonn period onward leaves us with no basis for doubt. Beethoven's music, early steeped in the most hubristic sweep of bold improvisations, represents the successive phases of self-development of what might at first seem to be sheer musical creativity (Freedom) for its own sake. Yet, throughout, the dominant feature of his hubristic impulses is a powerful moral force, amounting to the most concentrated expression of the principles of Freedom Necessity. It is proper to regard him therefore as the consummate revolutionary of his time, provided we do not banalize the notion of "revolutionary" as the early nineteenth century equivalent of "Socialist Realism." Beethoven's revolutionary impulse is essentially focused in the conception of himself as a man; his conception of what his activity must be as a musician man is the most concentrated elaboration art has produced of the notion of Freedom Necessity.[4]

The State of Modern Psychology

None of this historical evidence respecting the nature of the human mind enjoys better than a peripheral and indirect reflection in professional psychology. For this we properly restrict our attention to two branches of inquiry, psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology, making no more than the unavoidable references to such pathetic factions as "classical psychiatry" or behaviorism.

Both psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology are developments emerging at the turn of the century. Consequently, the occasion for their belated appearance predetermined that psychology would evolve in pathetic ignorance of its extant prerequisites. The characteristic flaws of and respective distinctions between these two branches of psychological inquiry are typical of a period of general intellectual decay in every field of fundamental inquiry but the physical sciences.

Sigmund Freud took perverse pride in his pathetic illiteracy in philosophy, a streak of naked philistinism in him perhaps sufficiently understood by examining the post1848 thrust of Viennese painters as well as the bankrupt political and moral condition of the Austrian monarchy. Christian Ehrenfels and his principal epigonoi, Wolfgang Koehler and Max Wertheimer, recognized the existence of the creative process in systematical terms, exactly where Freud and his principal disciples commit a fundamental flaw of omission in psychoanalytical "meta-psychology." Yet, Ehrenfels, who looks for the creative process in Mind precisely because he reflects the dialectical influence of Riemann, Cantor, Klein, et al., implicitly denies the social determination of conscious (and unconscious) processes, and thus founds a valuable branch of no direct clinical therapeutic applicability.

We should first summarize the implications of Ehrenfels' approach as they are best known through Koehler's chimpanzee experiments. It is most relevant to consider the epistemological reasons why Ehrenfels could discover the existence of the creative process where Freud, a thorough clinical investigator, with extraordinary creative powers of his own, shows not the slightest sensibility of the problem involved.

The notion of a (Gestalt) corresponds epistemologically to the dialectical subject, "I think," in Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." To Ehrenfels, et al., as for Descartes: For a plenum of particular predicates of experience, there exists a subject, the (concept) of the class of experiences as a totality, which is not a simple member of the aggregation of predicates, which cannot logically be induced from even the most intensive and prolonged analysis of its predicates.

Ehrenfels located a paradigm for solving such a problem (experimentally) in the notion of (invariant). The significance of this is implicit in analysis of the fundamental antinomy of line points relationship. In one important sense, limiting our view of Riemann's work to this subsumed feature, the notion of (invariant) resolves the problem of experimentally identifying the relationship of whole to its subsumed particularities for all kinds of simple configurations and alterations of configurations of predicated particular features. (Implicitly), and this bears upon the more important frontier like aspect of Riemann's work even to the present day, we must consider the impossibility of conceptualizing a whole as primary (elementary) with respect to its predicates (as, relatively, constructs) unless the invariant feature of the whole is self-development.

Given the general thesis, it should be evident that any effective experimental approach to psychological behavior which aimed at isolating the phenomenon of invariant for the historic relationship between concept and particularities, would represent the efficient approach for experimentally demonstrating the existence of the creative process! Indeed, what Ehrenfels and his leading epigonoi demonstrated in fact is Hegel's point that (even simple perception is a reflection of a creative process). The simplest sort of discrete mental image, including those of abstract logic, is not primary (self-evident sense phenomenon), but a "mere construct" of a physiology premising the human creative process of mentation!

Provided one extends such experimental and observational investigations in the obvious way, we encounter the fundamental antinomy in the most dreadful form. On the one hand, we naively regard the particularate form of sense phenomena and conscious mental images as self-evident, and consider it unthinkable to begin interpreting any aspect of reality as primitive except as one begins with "discrete images," "isolated simple facts." Yet, experimental investigation of the content of perception suffices to demonstrate that the axioms of discreteness are self-contradictory. even absurd!

This should signify to psychology that it must locate the fundamental substance (the elementary facts) of human mental processes beyond what are taken to be the conscious forms of conscious and unconscious activity. In the ordinary form of the conscious processes, thought is immediately in approximately the form it is abstractly represented by formal logic, a plenum of discrete object like images being moved about by relations in the form of "feelings." ((Cathexis) in psychoanalysis.)

As we indicated, Freud is clinically powerful exactly where Gestalt psychology fails. His founding of psychoanalysis is the discovery that the clinical feature of human psychology is socially determined, rather than a biologically determined function of individual experience: that the form of consciousness itself, as well as the regulating principle of judgment (ego ideals) is created within the individual by society, principally, in the initial period of extra uterine gestation, through the mediation of his parents and siblings. To that extent, Freud unwittingly replicated a crude approximation of the accomplishments of Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach.

The greatness of Freud is centrally situated in his application of his considerable powers of insight (creative powers) to examine the dynamics of individual psychology, always guided by a special passion for truth. In this side of this work, Freud rejected the organized lying which is empiricism, and so never created a category of clinical psychodynamics except as the kind of phenomena defined actually existed as distinct (Gestalts) for clinical work. In empiricism, by contrast, categories are treated with epistemological indifferentism as mere inductive constructs; if induction from an aggregation of arbitrarily or otherwise assembled predicates repeatedly demonstrates a similar pattern of correlation within certain tolerances for "significance," the empiricist blithely presumes that he is free to assert his inductive interpretation of the data as if such an edification were itself an existent reality. Hence, the complementary feature of empiricist intellectual immorality is the contempt for "theoretical work" among laymen and even the "theoreticians" themselves. Empiricism, the dominant intellectual immorality of contemporary capitalist culture, permits one to impute existence to all sorts of fictional rubbish; so, the reaction to this pathetic behavior is that all scientific judgment is regarded as "mere theory," as distinct from any ignorant man's superior" (impressionistic) interpretation of an isolated "hard fact.'' Freud's clinical categories (unlike his meta-psychology) are all experimentally demonstrated to be empirically isolatable causes, or empirically known states. One sympathizes with and admires Freud's moral abhorrence for what he regarded rightly as irresponsible speculations in such students as the wild Wilhelms, Stekel and Reich.

The shortfall of Freud's method becomes epistemologically clear when we consider his treatment of a certain aspect of the unconscious processes as (categorically unconscious); he regarded certain aspects of unconscious processes as intrinsically not susceptible of being made conscious. His various efforts to develop a "meta-psychology," are inevitably permeated with reductionist metaphysics, a metaphysical fantasy world of'" instincts'' and other crudely mechanistic epiphenomenal categories of mentation.

The powerful contrast in implicit epistemological outlook of two of his more widely read writings gives an indication of the difficulty for him. In (The Future of An Illusion) (1927), his outlook is essentially that of Feuerbach, and not distant from the world outlook of Marx. Two years later, we have (Civilization and its Discontents), an almost Dionysian revel in pessimistic reductionist metaphysics. The profitable approach to comparison of these two works is to recognize that their differences in outlook can not be sufficiently explained from Freud's work and experiences during the intervening period. The mechanistic tendency is strong in the "meta-psychology" studies of the earlier war period, and elsewhere in the general development of the notion of the "Id." Freud vacillated between the two tendencies, the semi dialectical and the reductionist, throughout his work.

One effective approach to the distinctions between the works is to recognize that in (The Future of An Illusion), Freud is relying upon the aspect of his practice which bears more directly on his clinical work, upon his fundamental achievements. In the works dominated by the opposing tendency, he is veering into regions where he is epistemologically incompetent to judge the significance of his own clinical findings.

This leaves us with two immediate lines of discussion to be considered, to get at what psychoanalysis does accomplish and to get underneath its clinical superstructure to locate the wretched epistemological foundations which prevent it from developing psychology more profoundly. We treat the first here, and the other in the following section on Marxian Psychology.

Basis for Clinical Work

In the phylogenesis of the typical adult petit bourgeois personality ("character structure") of U.S. urban regions comparable in this respect to Metropolitan New York City, we can readily distinguish the following distinct phases, each with its actual and otherwise potential contribution to the successive phases. Usually, the happiest phase is that of infancy, during which reasonably sane parents generally extend undifferentiated love toward the infant, so nourishing every variety of increase in the infant's powers. The misery begins with the second phase, usually highlighted by efforts to induce "bowel training." Undifferentiated love ceases, love is increasingly withdrawn for certain kinds of the child's development of his powers and continued only for others. The child is subjected to distinctions of "good" and "bad, In terms of the continuation and withholding of parental love respecting the development of his powers. One has the image of the more revealing child of this phase, who strikes out at his mother saying, in one fashion or another. "Why don't you love me when I'm bad, too?" The third phase is still more cruel. "Good" and "bad" become more complex, as the awarding and withholding of love from the parents and siblings tends to be mediated through the opinions of ''others'' outside the household; teachers, playmates, and other such "outsiders." As puberty approaches, an aggravation of this estrangement occurs. At the same time the child now experiences a qualitative increase in lessening of parental love (both by his parents and by virtue of his own internalized ideals), he begins to be made aware that he can look forward to a surrogate for lost parental love in the form of a relationship like that between his mother and father. He adduces from hints, gossip, and what have you the report that the lost feeling of "being loved," that which he has lost since infancy, can be regained by the performance of some mysterious act with a peer of the opposite sex. He also learns that it is "too soon" for him to reach such a paradisiacal state. For most such persons this is the "awkward age" between the accelerating loss of active parental love and the distant future gaining of a replacement. The fifth phase begins as he comes to regard himself as "sexually mature," in a social as well as a biological sense; the assuming or self-denial of a paired mating relationship (or, being externally denied this), becomes a central preoccupation. Then, usually at a time approaching the end of baccalaureate matriculation for the exemplary strata under consideration, we enter the sixth phase. He is being "economically" semi weaned in the social identity he outwardly, and privately, affords to himself. Somewhere between twenty-four and thirty, for typical cases, the individual enters "middle age," sensing his life now almost finished.

There are two immediately discernible approaches to the interpretation of this phylogenetical process. The banal, reductionist approach treats the regulating principle of "love" in this development as an epiphenomenon of the genetical, as a more or less reified "biological sex drive.'' The extreme pathological version of such views in psychoanalysis is exemplified by the case of Wilhelm Reich, who brought hysterically reductionist prejudices into his psychoanalytical training, and whose later charlatanry of "or-gone energy" is essentially nothing but a consistent if pathetic extension of the mechanistic conceptions of sexuality which govern his writings of the pre Hitler period. We have a hint of the hysterical element in the notion of the "biological sex drive"-even in the mild and ambivalent form it recurs in Freud's own work. The attempt to make pubertal and post pubertal "love" a reified epiphenomenon of a "biological sex drive" compels the reductionist in Freud to contort the sensuous aspect of sociality, to impose the fiction of the "sex drive" upon even the defenseless infant.

The opposite approach, which is not without merely apparent but apparently monstrous epistemological difficulties, is to regard the post pubertal "sex" drive as a predicate of the need for love. Love itself is the primary phenomenon. The basis for this approach was developed by the successive contributions of Spinoza, Hegel, and Feuerbach. To settle the problems incurred by this approach, we must refer the matter to the next section, where we examine the problem of the distinction between human and animal psychology.

Immediately, we must finish our summary respecting the unique positive, clinical basis for psychoanalytical work.

Effective clinical work must approach the genesis of neurotic disturbances from the at least implicit correct assumption that consciousness and the principal features of unconscious processes involved are socially determined, through some sort of successive phases of individual development corresponding to the mode of maturation of the population from which the clinical subject is drawn. As (The Future of An Illusion) would imply to the perceptive reader, neurosis and its appendages are to be treated as a special case of (ideology), in the sense we earlier attributed ideology to the prevailing self-images among workers of various capitalist sectors.

Obviously, psychoanalysis is not (at least generally) a program intended to turn subjects of capitalist society into true human beings (i.e., socialists), so the analyst is inhibited by conscience as well as by his own ideological prejudices from engaging in the more fundamental effort of stripping away (entirely) the ideological muck which constitutes the individual persona. Since the analyst is unable to offer his subject a mass movement orientation in which to locate a new, positive social identity, if the analyst were concerned to strip away the persona, the result would be frequent psychoses and suicides among the individuals so stripped of those protective illusions which hide from them the emptiness of their (individual qua individual) lives. The analyst has more limited objectives, (approximating the form and technique which would be employed properly in totally stripping away the bourgeois persona).

If one accepts such a limitation, as Freud and most other analysts have, the competence of clinical work is restricted to two somewhat interconnected results. Firstly, to the extent that the individual's neurotic (dysfunctioning) represents behavior which does not correspond to the reality of his individual life situation, his problem tends to be of the form of reflected pressures acting upon him as internalized images of actual or synthesized individuals and groups (from his past). To the extent that such problems can be brought to consciousness, the subject freed of his internalized oppressors with the aid of the analyst's role as a surrogate father, the individual can be "cured" of much of that behavior and internal suffering which is out of correspondence with the reality of his bourgeois individual existence. Secondly, the individual's dysfunctioning is frequently enough linked to circumstances which are themselves destructive of his functioning as a bourgeois individual; also the individual may have brought additional such poisonous circumstances upon himself as a result of his neurosis. In such connections, the subject may be induced to willfully alter his circumstances-job, personal relationships, and so forth as an essential practical concomitant of his attack on the historical roots of the problem.

The essential feature of this process is (love). The point is perhaps best illustrated by referring to a development which either predetermines (potential) revolutionaries by the age of about five or six, or otherwise, contrary character development; the "schlimihl syndrome."

Every individual who has manifest significant creative output in later life can undoubtedly recall incidents from approximately that age which parallel the following example. He experiences a relationship which was later soiled by the self degrading response of that playmate to social pressures. The playmate, under social pressure, would "hear the cock crow thrice" and thereupon repudiate or otherwise reject an interest or opinion which he had earlier professed in the course of the exchanges between the two playmates. In the years that followed, the future creative adult was increasingly pained to observe members of his peer groups undergoing changes in passionately held opinions and tastes in more or less perfect synchronization with prevailing fads. "Why do you do that?" he perhaps had asked such labile playmates and peers. The probable response, "Because it's good," or "Because I just like it," was, of course, singularly unconvincing. He began to regard such persons-the majority of his age group-as persons without "souls of their own." Persons whose convictions were proverbially "mortgaged" to varying extents to whatever peer group they wished to propitiate at that moment.

What, one should reflect most intensely, is the basis for the determining difference in personal character, even at age five or six, between the rare creative individual and the overwhelming majority, victims of the schlimihl syndrome? To make short of the point, the creative individual develops from the child who was better loved in infancy and whose first phase of childhood, uncharacteristically for our culture, did not so undermine his sense of positive identity (the quality of meriting love) that his self estimation depended largely on (short-term) favorable peer group opinion. The creative individual develops out of the child who has been loved for his development of his powers such that he has internalized a powerful self-confidence in progressive development of his powers of judgment.

The dynamics of this should be obvious from the standpoint of what we identified as the second and third phases of the child's development. (In the succeeding sections, we shall be considering the underlying epistemological basis for this approach.) The withdrawal of love is, in form and implicit content, a withdrawal of the social basis for the child's sense of identity, his sense of having the rights and privileges on which his existence depends-as those rights and privileges exist for him in his power to command the behavior of others in the interest of his existence. If we examine the problems of the second phase of development of the individual, we see the source of major disturbances in personality development here, even if we assumed that the prior period of infancy was "virtually perfect." Perhaps for an instant one is angrily impelled to consider eliminating this second phase entirely. Yet, that "solution" neither exists in practice, nor is it to be desired "even in a socialist society." The child's increase in powers beyond a certain age become the capacity for (ignorantly) destructive and self-destructive acts. The child must develop a sense which acts, under what circumstances, are positive, and which to be abjured correspondingly. The question of the second phase is therefore not of how to eliminate it, but of what constitutes the desirable approach to the necessary socialization of the post infant.

There are two general alternatives. The one most in use is "negation of the negation,'' more or less as Kant described this in his (Critique of Practical Reason). The individual of post infancy "knows" that his existence (his power to mediate his existence through rights and privileges) depends chiefly on the love (implicit commitment to his desired rights and privileges) of his parents. He must "please them," thus perpetuating and increasing their love for him. Consequently, in such a "negation of the negation" determination of the socialized personality, the child seeks to maintain the love on which his power to exist depends, by negating those "impulses within himself" which his society (his parents) negates: the "schlimihl syndrome."

Rarely, in contrast, he may be socialized by an alternative approach, that corresponding to a (self subsisting positive). He accepts responsibility for mastering the knowledge by which he can determine "rationally" those forms of his behavior which make his existence valuable to his society (e.g., immediately, his parents and siblings). This approach cannot be merely limiting his acts to those which are immediately beneficial to others. His value to others, especially at that age, chief1y demands his developing his power of discovery, of those forms of activity which are socially positive under varying circumstances: notably, his creative powers. Although this is the program to be desired for childrearing between the ages of approximately eighteen months and five years. the post infantile individual can assimilate such opportunity only to the extent that his infancy has prepared him for such freedom (and responsibility) The extensive mooting of the proper approach to the "problem of bowel training" exemplifies the extant. crude, almost trivial insight into these alternatives.

In principle, the development of the self subsisting positive form of childhood socialization is constantly premised on the focusing of parental love for the child upon the development of his powers to make independent discriminations of what is positive social behavior. Since the "schlimihl syndrome" is not only the characteristic molecular expression of bourgeois ideology, but also the mediation principle of neurosis, the analyst properly extends (but also limits) love to the subject for the subject's development of the powers to judge what are positive acts. At the same time, on the basis of this "support," the analyst impels the subject to discriminate sanity, stupidity, and so forth (among the various internalized voices) stored up within the neurotic, creating an approximation of a healthy reconstruction of the post infantile socialization phase.

We need merely acknowledge that the analyst must have competent knowledge of clinical psychodynamics, and to thus be able to steer the subject's self-critical processes in productive directions. More important is the analyst's ability to match an appropriate (corresponding) kaleidoscopic array of "feeling states" within himself to the succession of such states which the subject is experiencing.

The analysts' most urgent duty is to direct the explorations in such a way, that he can piece together precisely such a replication of the patient's feeling state dynamics (within himself). It is not only the succession of feeling states as such which is involved here. The feelings exist for the subject only as attached companions of object images (cathexis), internalized images which are variously persons, specific experiences, and so forth. By establishing the pattern of feeling states and discerning the cathetical connections, the analyst is enabled to take the subject's mind inside his own. There he can now examine this replication, the operation of insight. The powers to accomplish this are not acquired by whim, although there are laymen through out society who have more or less unconsciously developed approximations of the same capacity. Almost equally significant in the process is the fact that the "taking in" of a replication of a neurotic pattern into one's own mind is a dreadful experience. Only an ingénue of a pathetic individual would profess a desire to take another person's mind inside his own for entertainment; more often, the experience is so sickening and debilitating that the analyst himself must develop the capacity to experience the replication without becoming the victim of his subject's pathology.

Experiences approximating this analyst subject relationship occur in daily life among ordinary people. Most instructive in that connection is the corollary of this, the nature and widespread use of devices by which individuals ordinarily block out deeper insights into the mental processes of others. Reflect how often have you "felt" yourself beginning to assimilate a replication of another person's troubled mental state into your own mental processes, and have quickly stopped the process by a commonplace ruse. You probably blocked the process of assimilation by quickly and insistently giving a (name) to the phenomenon confronting you. "In other words," you say, "the problem is...." adding the (name). Immediately, you follow that glib naming of the phenomenon by suggesting a "canonical" remedial action "for such problems," proceeding as if to suggest you had suddenly looked the name of the phenomenon up in some medical textbook and have begun reciting the glosses on etiology, prognosis and treatment, thus, by chatting away in that fashion, happily closing your mind against further insight into the actual phenomenon.

Analogous behavior is commonplace among members of socialist groups. The member, confronted with the problem of introducing a preliminary working notion of socialist politics into the mind of an interested contact, escapes the difficulties of the situation by reciting some cant, such as "dictatorship of the proletariat," all the while with a glint of hysteria in his own eyes as he recites such anesthetic banalities. Exemplary of the point :"dictatorship of the proletariat" is a term developed by Karl Marx to identify an actualized intermediate form of the political class for itself). The term was developed by Marx to situate the empirical actuality of certain tendencies in the Paris Commune within a broader and more fundamental conception,. the class-for-itself process, earlier explicated in such locations as the (Communist Manifesto) and (The Poverty of Philosophy). Interestingly enough, one frequently meets Leftists who deride the class-for-itself conception by insisting that that notion is an idealist's rejection of the revolutionary practical "dictatorship of the proletariat." They so employ the recital of what is (for them) a cant phrase to protect their minds against (actually) the threat to their (bourgeois ego ideals) implicit in even a formal assimilation of Marx's outline of the (class-for-itself concept).

In a similar way, most of the significant internal features of clinical psychoanalytical work occur, perhaps unwittingly as commonplace transactions within the socialist movement. This is not to merely emphasize that the socialist movement shares such tendencies with society more generally: there is a qualitative distinction between the Left and society generally on exactly that point. Because the activity of socialist groups is task oriented toward attempting to explore and remove bourgeois ideology, and since the psychodynamics of ideology are only the more general form for the psychodynamics of neurosis, the intellectual preoccupations of the socialist profession properly impel the movement, however reluctantly, to converge upon much of the work of psychoanalysis in that respect. This aspect of the matter is complemented by the "official pariah" status of being a member of such an organization, a circumstance of social stress which brings certain crises of the carried forward bourgeois character formation to the fore in a way approximating that appropriate to the psychoanalytical session.

The Fraud of "Spontaneous Remission"

By contrast with psychoanalysis, "classical psychiatry" and various forms of behaviorist therapy are charlatanry. This is not to deny that both varieties sometimes produce apparent "cures" in a certain fashion. The point to be made is forced into focus by a quick overview of the myth of "spontaneous remission."

The so-called "objective studies" of "spontaneous remission" have been employed as libels variously against both the psychoanalysts and the anti-analysts. In all cases, the point is to argue that the ratio of neurotics recovering without treatment is not significantly less than among those receiving it. The same method may be used to pretend that classical psychiatry secures as high a ratio of remission as psychoanalysis. Either way, the statistics are worthless: the conception of "spontaneous remission" used for such actual and fictitious studies is buncombe.

The dominant conception of "mental illness" has only an accidental correspondence to any scientific notion of mental health. It may be a cause for public shock to hear muckraking reports that the majority of the aged committed to public snake pits are incarcerated chiefly because it was convenient to their grandchildren or others to get rid of them in this fashion. There is nothing in this atrocity inconsistent with the corpus of prevailing psychiatric practice! The definition of "mental illness" used generally is that some person's behavior, condition, or even mere existence is regarded as a nuisance by other persons. When their existence and conduct is no longer considered a serious nuisance, or when shrinking stale budgets demand reducing mental health care services, "suddenly" and "mysteriously" the "mental illness" enjoys "remission."

Some of the more popular methods of treatment are especially instructive to the same effect. At the head of the list, one might place electric shock "therapy," which Freud exposed as charlatanry at the time of the inception of this barbarous practice. Significantly, electric shock "therapy" was developed by the Kaiser's Army during World War I, as a disciplinary procedure for terrifying and torturing combat fatigue cases back into the trenches. It works, in a certain manner of speaking; given a patient "guilty" of untoward behavioral episodes, a certain degree of "improvement" in their conduct could be effected, even for profound mental problems, by the following procedure. It is irrelevant whether the shocks are applied to the head, nor are any expensive hospital facilities required. Indeed, the stronger the resemblance of the treatment room to a medieval torture chamber the more certain the ensuing "remission." Strap the subject securely to a stout plank and, optionally, sloshing the nude body liberally with salt water, apply the contacts from a high voltage coil to the genitalia. If the first "treatment" does not induce "remission," repeat the "medication" in increased doses until the desired remission or death occurs. One can guarantee an impressive ratio of short-lived apparent "remissions."

Psychosurgery and the less drastic approximation of the same result, saturating the victim with drugs, are of the same general quality as psychological medicine. Psychosurgery or saturating the case with pills "works" by means of aborting or reducing the level of mental functioning. One way to suppress symptoms of mental dysfunctioning is to lower the level of possible activity of the nervous and endocrine systems below the "threshold level" at which episodes will appear. The mindless do not exhibit active mental disturbances.

Only one concession could be offered for "chemotherapy" from the standpoint of psychology. There are certain forms of neurotic patterns, as some manic-depressives, in which the episodes themselves are self aggravating or may involve destructive behavior by the subject. Since the object of treatment is to ensure that the patient survives to the day when treatment can produce results, a restrained employment of the minimal required level of chemical "inhibitions" may be permissible or necessary. However, in no case could chemotherapy cure the dysfunction itself.

"Conditioned reflex" and other behaviorist clinical methods are all of a homogeneous kind of charlatanry. At best, they are subtler versions of the crude electric shock "therapy" ruse, applying techniques perfected in the training of pathetic performing animals and fleas to the analogous training of people. The worst feature of behaviorist therapy is not the speciousness of the claims which represent animal training as human cures, but the fact that behaviorist methods necessarily, in all cases must produce a significant reduction in the subject's intelligence and at the same time make the individual more vulnerable to "nervous breakdowns" and actual psychoses.

More broadly on "spontaneous remission," the following points are sufficient. In most people who experience significant neurotic episodes at some time in their lives, these episodes have been latently there all along, merely awaiting the suitable circumstances in which they would manifest themselves. After either that specific stress has been removed, or the episodes have otherwise served their purpose for the subject, the subject will frequently revert to the more ''normal'' form of his neurosis he exhibited before the incidents. Does this sort of remission represent a return to mental health? There are admittedly the instances in which a person experiencing an episodic crisis will be driven to some positive improvement in his underlying mental functioning. Confronted with the threats to his identity itself, expressed in threatened job, marriage, etc., the individual may be driven to face certain problems and accomplish an approximation of what he might better have done with psychoanalytical help. In this sense, there is unquestionably what one intends by "spontaneous remission." Such instances are not at issue. What is at issue is that the criteria of studies of "spontaneous remission" do not discriminate between these instances and mere temporary remission of the episodic manifestation.

The definition of mental health generally employed in this society goes no deeper than classifying the symptoms of personal behavior as either approximately ''normal" or egregious. As the use of electric shock, psychosurgery, pill pushing, and toleration of behaviorist charlatanry attest, capitalist society has very little concern with anything more than the desirability of outward behavior. Such a crude fallacy of composition says very little about the systematic features of mentation.

This is not to exaggerate, to insist that all non-psychoanalytical psychiatrists are totally incompetent respecting mental disorders. The fact that a culture, by its specific nature, must produce a limited number of types of characteristic mental disturbances, and that each such type will frequently conform to a prima facie etiology, symptoms, and prognosis, permits tolerable performance, by capitalist standards, for the practice of "classical psychiatry" as a purely administrative procedure, a crude screening procedure by which this case is given a standard label and sorted out for this treatment accordingly, or discharged with a certain probable prognosis of remission. One must also add that over and above the intrinsic incompetence of psychiatry's claim to science, the individual classical psychiatrist may, by personal commitment and insight, rise above the banality of his learning and thus develop positive skills (despite his formal learning).

In the context of capitalist culture, the psychoanalyst is constrained to aim at behavioral results which conform to those demanded for clinical psychology of all forms. Behind such surface considerations, the actual improvement in mental health which may occur would be considered an "intangible" by the prevailing conventions. The proper objective of psychoanalysis, which it has been frequently clearly demonstrated to achieve, is a positive increase in the subject's capacities and social value as a human being. What might ordinarily be regarded as the cure effected would therefore occur as a mere byproduct of the essential result. We have already identified the reason for this. The focal feature of effective therapy by these methods is the use of the love of the surrogate parent, the analyst, to assist the subject in developing a stronger sense of inner personal worth, a result which tends to develop as the analyst focuses parental like compassion to the effect of "rewarding" the subject for progress in developing autonomous powers of creative insight into the willful determination of useful social behavior. To the extent that the subject develops a stronger sense of "inner self'' in this way, he has in that a greater ego strength to free himself of the ''schlimihl syndrome," both with respect to persons outside his skin, and with respect to the internalized persons who harass him within his mind. Since the neurotic disturbance is invariably focused on the "inner self's" imagined relationship to some or all of that internalized gallery of personalities, to the degree the subject is able to become less a schlimihl he is able to free himself of the compulsion to propitiate or ant propitiate (e.g., "kill") fetishistically the internalized persons who oppress him.

Freud versus Feuerbach

The obvious shortcoming of Koehler's work for theoretical psychology in general, in its own terms, is that the emphatically useful demonstration of creative mentation in higher apes and other species fails to distinguish between those qualities of mentation which in turn distinguish the mind of the ape absolutely from the human mind.

The distinction to be made overlaps the urgent inquiry into connected issue of human psychology itself. In this latter connection, the demonstration that even perception itself requires precursors of creative mentation confronts us with the need to test the hypothesis that there is a qualitative distinction between creative mentation respecting perception itself and some other order of creative mentation associated with the discrimination among ordinary and creative minds. The two issues are interrelated in the respect that Koehler's apes-and even animals much lower in intelligence than the apes-obviously embody something akin in some way to the creative processes associated with human perception.

The fact that there is a qualitative distinction of the human mind from that of the higher apes is already established in several major aspects of the matter by our general thesis. To treat this inquiry definitively, we begin here with the writer's much used pedagogy for presenting Feuerbach's notion of the determination of self-consciousness.

Figure 1 depicts the most naive of the reductionist interpretations of mental processes. (Cf., Locke, et al.) Both the individual person and the object (Xi) of his knowledge are axiomatically (explicitly or at least implicitly) taken as self evidently elementary. The object's existence impinges upon the sensory apparatus of the individual, through which connection he is presumed to "know" the object. The obviously pathetic fallacy in this schema is this. The assumption is demanded that the universe has been so prearranged that, on the one hand, the sensation ostensibly emanated by the object to the sensory apparatus is an appropriate code for the intrinsic nature of that object, and that, on the second hand, the mind of the individual has been predisposed to call forth an appropriate image of the external object through mere interpretation of the sensation as a code for that object image. In addition to the implicit requirement of such wild metaphysics, the schema eliminates the possibility that the human mind can acquire the power to identify objects from experience of the outer world, and in that way the notion of what human knowledge can become is limited to the exploration of the sequence of events as a sequential array of sensations of objects.

Figure 2 represents a variety of proposed remedies for the monstrous assumptions of the first schema. Both the Kantian view and the view sometimes originating from modern "information theory" are examples of this second outlook.

This schema has the advantage, relative to the first, that it eliminates the complete preceding of the sensations ostensibly emanating from the object. Knowledge of the (quality) of the object is not viewed as secured through isolated acts of sense e